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Methods measuring capital flight unfortunately yield a too wide band of estimates. A 
striking example is provided by estimates of capital flight from Russia. This study 
introduces unit-values analysis as a new and, hopefully, more robust tool in order to 
estimate trade-related capital flight. Trade-related capital flight prevails when capital 
account convertibility is strongly limited, as in the case of Russia. Unit values analysis 
aims at detecting the underpricing of exports and the overpricing of imports as the 
major flight channel. Using a multilateral translog price index we test for systematic 
deviations in EU export prices to Russia compared with exports to Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. As benchmark we selected exports to France. 
We limit our calculations to six-digit and four-digit chapters in 70 – 89 of the Combined 
Nomenclature (manufactured goods). We find no systematic deviation in calculated 
prices and conclude that underpricing of EU exports to Russia (Russian imports from 
EU) does not play a dominant role for capital flight through manufactured goods. We 
extended the test to EU imports of oil and oil products (chapter 27) and found evidence 
for the underpricing of Russian deliveries, mainly in the chapter 2710 (petroleum oil, 
not crude). 
JEL classification: C43, F30 




The use of unit values in estimating trade-related capital flight 
The case of CEE countries with special focus on Russia 
1.  Introduction 
Capital flight is unfortunately a too much differentiated concept, and the usual 
measurement concepts produce a too wide band of estimates (Loungani and Mauro 
2000). Our study introduces unit-values analysis as a new tool in order to estimate one 
channel of flight, namely trade-related capital flight. Unit-value indexes are commonly 
used in the empirical literature to analyse many international trade issues, particularly 
price competitiveness. They were not yet applied for the detection of "pure" systematic 
pricing practices of firms. We analyse trade-related capital flight from Russia. The 
former state monopoly in trade was lifted in mid-1992, but major controls over the 
capital account remained. All experts agree that capital flight soared in the 1990s. With 
central control over capital flows, the underpricing of exports and the overpricing of 
imports becomes a major flight channel. Our study concentrates on fake invoices in 
imports of differentiated goods. While capital flight through the export of raw material, 
oil, gas and the import of some staple food (wheat) seems to be rather well documented, 
few light was shed on capital flight through the main part of imports -- differentiated 
goods. Some experts assume that capital flight through imports of highly diversified 
commodities was even higher than that through exports of raw materials (Tikhomirov 
1997). The study is organised as follows: section two presents the history and channels 
of trade-related capital flight from Russia. We describe capital flight through differences 
between market and contract or transfer prices. Section three provides the essentials of 
the method for finding "pure" price differences from unit values. Section four tests for 
the importance and systematic of price deviations. We use multilateral  Törnquist 
translog index numbers to construct import prices from EU exports of manufactured 
goods to Russia and compare them with prices of exports to other countries. Section five 
concludes. 
2.  Trade-related capital flight from Russia 
The size of capital flight from Russia is estimated to have been enormous, especially in 
years prior to 1999 (between bn 14 and bn 36 US-Dollar in 1996 and 1997, Tikhomirov 
1997, Sheets 1995). These estimates stood for about 11 to 27 percent of Russia’s gross 
foreign debt. The non-availability of foreign exchange for debt-serving institutions 
(mainly the central government) increased the financial fragility of the Russian economy 




financial burden on all companies. Capital flight was the reason for weak control over 
monetary aggregates, for less tax incomes, it increased the strain on the (social) 
expenditure side of the fiscal balances and, certainly, contributed to short-term deficit 
financing that led directly into the financial crisis in August 1998. In addition, some 
forms generate transaction costs reducing even potential profits on the level of those 
enterprises that transfer incomes abroad. The causes for capital flight in a period of 
systemic transformation are well known: in an early stage, the former nomenclature (or 
communist leadership) tried to transfer its earlier stolen assets abroad. Tax evasion is 
another motive, mainly for the emerging private sector. Political instability causes 
managers of big state-owned or even privatised companies to search for a safe haven 
instead of declaring profits, etc. etc. 
The wide span of the estimates poses some methodological questions. We find two 
approaches in literature: the balance-of-payments analysis, and price comparisons. The 
bop analysis is based on flows in the capital account and on changes in the position of 
net errors and omissions. This method may overestimate capital flight for several 
reasons. One reason is linked to the general position of a country in the international 
economy. For a country like Russia exporting mainly raw material and energy, the 
structural surplus in trade needs to be coupled with capital exports. It is a tricky task to 
disentangle capital flight from normal capital export. A second cause of capital 
movements are normal portfolio diversification strategies of asset holders. When 
investors wish to correct their portfolio owing to factors such as a financial crisis in 
another region of the world, the outflow of capital is hardly to call capital flight. 
Compared with most Central and East European transition countries, where the current 
and capital accounts have been already liberalised, there were many controls on foreign 
exchange movements, particularly in the period under investigation (IMF, 2000). Hence, 
there are and there were yet only few occasions for non-trade related capital flight.1 
With severe controls, the main flight channel is through trade: artificially low export 
revenues and high import expenditures. 
The channels of trade-related capital flight are in general (a) barter, (b) sham credits, (d) 
transfer pricing and (c) fake invoices. In case of barter, the domestic firm exchanges 
exported commodities directly into imported ones. The foreign partner pays an 
additional charge, which remains on a foreign bank account. In case of sham credits, the 
domestic firm grants a credit on exports. The credit is meant to default artificially, and 
the export yields an official loss. Both forms were typically in an early stage of Russian 
transition, when Russia’s financial and banking system did not yet provide standard 
                                                 
1  There was a certain field for capital account transactions over which the Central Bank of Russia had 
little control. In some cases, Russian residents acquired offshore banks typically in countries where 
supervision of banks is inadequate to set up correspondent accounts with a resident bank. These 




financial services for trade deals ( Tikhomirov 1997).  Transfer pricing prevails in 
international firms with co-operative relations in production. It is mainly a playground 
for a producer in, say the EU, establishing a production unit in Russia (or other CEE 
countries) in line with outsourcing strategies. The mother company delivers some 
intermediate good to the unit in Russia for outward processing charging intra-firm 
prices; and the use of inner prices rather aims at avoiding taxes in the EU. The bilateral 
operation can be easily enlarged for the multilateral case which includes units in several 
countries with the headquarter steering the commodity and payment flows according to 
net profit maximisation. Because Russian manufacturing firms very seldom establish 
this kind of co-operation with affiliated units abroad, we assume that false invoicing is 
the broadest channel of capital flight from Russia since the mid of the 1990s. 
With fake invoices, domestically based companies sell (deliver) abroad for lower prices 
in international currency than they really charge customers (foreign units), or they buy 
abroad for higher prices than they really pay to their suppliers. False invoicing2 could be 
the purpose of middleman firms established by domestic companies abroad. A company 
in a certain country A, say Russia, establishes a trading house in a second country B, say 
Germany. This establishment changes the hitherto direct and "normal" channel of trade. 
The 'middleman' buys from the German producer at the market price and re-sells it to 
the Russian mother firm at a higher price (see Figure 1). The trading house realises the 
profit, which will be taxed according to German tax law, but the net income of the 
Russian mother firm remains abroad (or can be re-patriated for financial investment 
purposes). If the middleman company is located in a third country C, say, Cyprus, the 
whole trade operation is called 'transit trade' of country C and indirect trade of countries 
A and B. 
Trade related capital flight via middleman trade is not a phenomenon new for Russia. It 
was even a fact in closed economies w ith state monopoly in foreign trade. The 
increasing number of trading houses in east-west trade in the 1970s and 1980s also 
mirrors the organisation of capital flight from the centrally planned and closed 
economies often organised by members of the communist leadership. (Of course,  
traditional trading houses also served for solving counter trade ( Gabrisch and 
Stankovsky, 1989)). The new private, privatised and even yet state-owned, but less-
controlled Russian companies exploit under free trade conditions those channels state 
firms used for capital flight under the Soviet era. And the mushrooming trading houses 
in some smaller low-tax countries in Europe in the 1990s give evidence of a common 
                                                 
2  Tikhomirov (1997) calls it ‘doubleinvoicing’ because the Russian exporter or importer closes two 
contracts with the foreign partner (or affiliate): The official invoice is the basis for reporting and 








The scheme of fake invoices and middleman trade 
Company in country
A


















False invoicing practice increases not only macroeconomic burdens, but reduce also 
efficiency on the micro level. The purpose of the establishment of offshore trading 
houses is not to increase turnover (and production) but to enlarge a market exchange of 
goods and money by a non-market exchange. This raises costs for the entire economy: 
the company bears transaction and financing costs for the establishment and running of 
the trading house. Assume alternatively a legal tax relief the exporting or importing 
                                                 
3  Counter trade in east-west trade was explained by the shortage of foreign exchange of the socialist 





company could benefit from. Then, the net profit of the firm would be higher without 
running the trading house, and the welfare effect would be positive. 
The appropriate approach to measuring overwhelmingly trade-related capital flight 
would be the comparison between ‘world market prices’ and prices in invoices. When 
world prices are known, capital flight via false invoicing might be detected pretty soon 
by tax authorities. World market prices, however, are not always known, and capital 
flight might be underestimated. World market prices seem to be mostly known in the 
case of raw materials and other, more or less, homogeneous goods. In November 2000, 
the Russian Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Tax Police issued a report 
showing that oil companies sold to affiliate offshore trading companies at sub-market 
prices. The report said that the state was losing $ 9 bn a year (about 5 % of the gross 
domestic product) in tax receipts.
4 This example seems to demonstrate that political 
power of big oil companies may prevent tax authorities from punishment of those 
practices. In a similar way, capital flight through imports of homogenous commodities 
could be easily detected.  Tikhomirov (1997) reported various Russian comparisons, 
published in newspapers, between the value of imports of wheat, maize, sunflower oil 
and white sugar at world prices and Russian contract prices. The difference was a US 
dollar 100 mn capital flight in 1994´. This huge difference could not be explained by 
freight costs. 
Is a comparison between world and contract prices of an individual country a correct 
method? Some doubts arise. A first concern is indeed the cif/fob difference. A robust 
method should exclude such distortions. A second, more severe, concern is the term 
‘world price’. Even homogenous goods have different world prices: long-term contract 
prices of oil or gas differ from spot prices of the same quality. Table 1 provides an 
example about different world prices for 1994. We calculated from Eurostat unit values 
of exports and imports of wheat and maize. The first row reports the unit value of EU 
exports to Russia in two positions: wheat and meslin (chapter 10190), and maize or corn 
(chapter 1005). The second and the third rows report the unit values of EU imports in 
the identical positions from the USA and Canada. Which one is the correct world price? 
Let us assume that Russian middleman in the EU imported maize from the USA for 171 
US dollar per ton and re-sold it to Russia for a 1,244 US dollar per ton, a huge capital 
flight had happened. If the middleman imported the maize from Canada for 1,618 US 
dollar, capital flight were from the EU to Russia. This examples shows that a method 
correcting for different ‘world’ prices is needed. 
                                                 
4  See Goldman Sachs Economics: Daily news & views  - new European markets, Middle East and 





Unit values in EU trade with wheat and maize in US dollars, 1994 
Unit values in …..  Wheat and meslin  
(CN 100190) 
Maize or corn  
(CN 1005) 
EU exports to Russia  91.6  1,244 
EU imports from the US  166.6  170.9 
EU imports from Canada  179.6  1,618 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat data. 
3.  Analyzing "pure" price differences in international trade 
A systematic way to estimate the importance of capital flight via trade in manufactures 
goods is a unit-values analysis. Starting point is the assumption that capital flight is 
mirrored in international price differences. International customs statistics, however, do 
not report prices of individual commodities but rather trade values and quantities. Ne-
vertheless, they base on information companies provide on fob or cif term. EU statistics, 
for example, report exports at fob term, hence, transportation cost, tariffs of the country 
of destination etc. is not included in prices. The traditional tool for gaining information 
on price developments from trade statistics are unit values obtained by dividing the 
export or import value by a quantity indicator, mostly metric tons.5 The main problem 
with unit-value indexes roots in aggregation. The higher the level of aggregation the 
larger the bias from changes in the mix of commodities and countries of supply or 
demand. In the further we will use the term 'commodity prices' for all items at the 6-digit 
level of trade statistics. Some earlier studies used 5 -digit levels  (Kravis and Lipsey 
1971). Most recently applied indexes are constructed at the 7-digit level. We use the EU 
trade statistics that offers 8- and 6-digit levels. At 8-digit levels, many items would drop 
out, and the loss of information is not smaller than when using 6-digit levels. 
Industry-level prices are calculated at the next higher level of aggregation, hence at the 
4-digit. We start with industry-level unit values. Neglecting the minor bias of aggre-
gation at the 6-digit levels we will find the impact of almost pure commodity price 
differences at the industry-level price index.  The theory of index numbers helps to 
construct these price indexes. 
For the construction of the adequate price index for our application out of unit-values let 
us start with three simple statements: 
(1)  Pi is an industry-level vector of fixed prices pi of a commodities vector Xi with 
i c= (1,....., M) commodities. 
                                                 
5  We neglect the problems with this measure. For further discussion see Greenaway, Hine, and Milner 




(2)  The price index of the industry level, P(Pi) depends on the vector of fixed 
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The nominator represents the industry-level value, the denominator the quality index of 
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we obtain from (1) 
i A / ) i p ( R ) i P ( P =   (3) 
(1)  Then, in the bilateral case comprising two observation points in time or two 
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According to the economic theory of index numbers (for an overview see Diewert 1991) 
unit values do not automatically equal the arithmetic or geometric mean of price 
differences P(Pi) of a number M of commodities. Only if there were no difference in the 
quality vectors (Ai) in both observations we may assume that the industry-level prices 
are tantamount to the unit values. 
After re-arrangement and taking the logs we obtain from (4) for the bilateral case 
) i P ( lnP* II
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with P*(Pi) being the price difference at the industry level. The unit value then is the 
construct from the two component vectors of quality and price. 
The crucialaspect in our study is the price index. Our considerations follow now the 
usual path in literature. Here, the theory of index  numbers is microeconomically 




( ) N x ,......., x x 1 ”  quantities and fixed prices. Then consumers and producers minimize 
their expenditure. Doing this, the composition of the aggregator function as well as the 
price index of the commodity bundle is determined by the form of the aggregator 
function and the given utility u: 
} { ) p ( uc ) p , ( uC u ) x ( F : x p min ) p , u ( C
i i x i ” = ‡ ” 1   (6) 
with  C as expenditure function dependent on given  u and  p and being linearly 
homogeneous. Then, total expenditures are a product of the given utility level and the 
minimum costs for the production of one unit of this utility, c(p). Though this has not 
very much to do with reality, the approach allows for the development of price indices 
(including unit values), that fulfill various mathematical requirements. Index numbers 
with the best results are so-called 'superlative' index numbers, for example the Fisher 
index, the Törnquist index and the Walsh index. They are all geometric indexes. These 
indexes imply that each unit cost function belongs to an aggregator function F ('exact' 
indexes) and fulfills the product-test equality: The product of the price and the quantity 
index equals the value ratio of both observations I and II. All superlative index numbers 
can be used alternatively in empirical analysis. They approach to each other to less than 
0.2 % in time serious analysis and to about 2 % in cross section analysis (Diewert 1991). 
In some recent studies the  Törnquist-index has been used. In the bilateral case, the 
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S reports the share of the value of all individual quantities of i in the total value traded in 
















. A change in the price index at the industry level then 
is determined exclusively (with given value shares) by a change in the prices of 
individual commodities. 
The problem with the bilateral price index is transitivity: results obtained heavily 
depend on the order in which observations are chosen for comparison. The bias is of 
minor importance in time-series application because of its natural ordering. The problem 
may, however, become significant for data c ontaining both time-series and cross-
sectional elements as in our study. A multilateral translog index is used to solve the 




containing information on all observations  N of a given sample and, thus, the 
multilateral index is derived by taking the difference in two bilateral comparisons: 
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By viewing  i S and  i p ln  as the cost shares and logarithmic prices each bilateral 
comparison is between an observation of interest I and the hypothetical base observation 
II. The average index  i S  includes all observations N of the single commodity i in the 
panel.6 Aw and Roberts (1988) used the Törnquist index for decomposing the increase 
of aggregate import prices into changes of quality and changes of the unit values in 
exports into the USA during 1994-1982 according to equation (5). (See a similar 
approach on Spain by Martines-Zarzoso and Suarez Burguet 2000). 
This multilateral translog price index is used to measure the price of EU exports by 
country of destination. Equation (9) contains observable data from EU customs statistics 
and will further on serve for the empirical investigation of systematic price deviations in 
exports to Russia (Russian imports from the EU). The term 'systematic' includes some 
comparison with EU exports to other countries. 
A pure price index would represent cost differences according to equation (6). 
Deviations between trade of a given country with various other countries are to explain 
by other determinants, that is price policy of companies in an environment of imperfect 
competition. The cost determinant can be excluded in our r esearch because we use 
export data of the European Union implicitly assuming a certain production function for 
the entire Union (the same 'average' productivity, factor endowment).  Since we cannot 
exclude industry specific effects we have to use some tests to determine the likelihood 
of fake invoicing practices. 
                                                 
6  If I and II are countries, N reports the number of years; if I and II are years, N reports the number of 




4.  Testing and results 
4.1 Data and method 
We use data from Eurostat Combined Nomenclature chapters 7 and 8. Chapters 70 
throughout 81 include glass, pearls and base metals and articles thereof. Chapters 82 
throughout 89 are products of machinery industries (Annex Table A). We consider 
exports of the EU to Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. We calculate relative prices taking France as the EU benchmark. We believe 
that capital flight in the EU to France via transfer pricing or sham invoicing is not a 
significant practice of firms. Cif/fob differences do not distort our analysis since we use 
only export data. 
One important feature of both sets of industries is that the EU run trade deficits in 
chapters 70-81 with the countries considered, but surpluses in chapters 82-89 (Annex 
Table B). These industry specifics (possibly due to factor endowment differences) could 
have some influence over the channel of capital flight. Though we test EU exports for 
overpricing, capital flight might also occur via EU imports (underpricing). 
Exports were taken at the 6 -digit level (commodity level). The six-digit level was 
aggregated to the 4-digit level (industry-level). The entire sample contains 1,630 items 
which stand for about 61 % of all EU exports to Russia of chapters 3 to 8. Unit values 
were calculated from values and quantities for years 1996, 1997, 1998 and on average of 
these years. We assume capital flight to be particularly pronounced in this period. Price 
indexes on the industry level (4-digit) for Russia were related to indexes for France and 
compared with differentials of other transition countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). 
A problem typical for this kind of data generation is the lack of either quantitative or 
value entries in exports of some items at the 6-digit level. In these cases, data have to be 
imputed in order to avoid bias. We decided for the following imputation procedure: 
-  If one entry were missing, the average of the remaining two was taken. 
-  If two entries were missing, the reported one was taken for the remaining 
two. 
-  If all three entries in value or quantity were  missing, the item was deleted 
from calculation. 
Constructing  i S  and  i p ln from 6 -digit-level data we added all observable 
I
i S and 
I
i p ln and divided the sum by the number N of the observations. The maximum number 
of observations was 7 (7 countries x 1 average of three years). In case of some countries 




calculate unit values or shares. We deleted all items for which the number of obser-
vations was less than six. 
4.2 Results 
The first step was to calculate mean values, standard deviations and the coefficient of 
variation of the entire panel and of two panels 70-81 and 82-89 (Table 2). 
Table 2: 
Descriptive statistics of lnP* 
CN Chapters 71 throughout 89 
   Russia  Poland  Czech Republic  Hungary  Bulgaria  Romania 
Mean  -1.438  -0.116  -0.085  -0.129  -0.755  -0.173 
Standard deviation  1.660  0.475  0.636  0.640  1.029  0.858 
Coefficient of variation:  2.756  0.226  0.404  0.410  1.060  0.736 
70 throughout 81 
Mean  0.108  0.001  -0.024  0.045  -0.559  -0.041 
Standard deviation  1.155  0.514  0.867  0.751  1.099  1.071 
Coefficient of variation:  1.334  0.264  0.752  0.564  1.208  1.148 
82 throughout 89 
Mean  -2.343  -0.185  -0.120  -0.232  -0.870  -0.250 
Standard deviation  1.171  0.438  0.448  0.542  0.971  0.696 
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At first inspection we observe values that represent higher prices in EU exports to 
Russia in chapters 70-81, but lower prices in exports in chapters 82-89. Since the latter 
represent more sophisticated and differentiated goods, the result is somewhat surprising. 
Capital flight from Russia in less and to Russia in more sophisticated goods? We 
compared the results with values obtained from EU exports to Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania.  With the exception of exports to Bulgaria, 
prices in export of chapters 70-81 to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania 
are more or less the same as prices in exports to France. In machinery and equipment 
exports, most exports to the other countries yielded a lower price than exports to France, 
like in the case of exports to Russia. The first conclusion then reads that false invoicing 
seems to be a strategy in Russian imports of less sophisticated goods, but not of 
machinery and transport equipment. 
The next step was to test for the comparability of the mean values by double T-test 
(Table 3). Since most Ho < |1.96| in the panel 70-81 for Russia, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Price differences between the countries in these chapters are not systematic 
(except to Bulgaria and cannot be compared. The picture changes for the panel 
consisting of chapters 82-89.
 In exports of machinery and transport equipment the test 
reveals the comparability of mean values, though EU export prices are lower than prices 
in EU exports to France. 
How could we explain these results? 
A first possible explanation is that price differences reflect a pricing-to-markets strategy 
of firms in machinery and transport equipment. This strategy considers differences in 
the countries’ purchasing power. When the GDP per capita of the Czech Republic is 
higher than in Bulgaria, EU exporters might charge a higher price for the same good. 
Indeed, among the other CEE countries, relative prices (measured in terms of France) in 
exports to Bulgaria are the lowest compared with Poland, the Czech Republic or 
Romania. Russia’s purchasing power is lower than that of EU and other candidate 
countries (but relatively close to that of Bulgaria).7 
                                                 
7  The WIIW calculated the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of Russia for 1996-1998 at about 
30 % of the EU average. For the other counties considered we find:  about 38 % (Poland), about 60 % 





Results of double t-tests of mean values 
CN chapters 70 throughout 89 
   Russia  Poland  Czech Republic  Hungary  Bulgaria  Romania 
Russia                   
Poland  -12.501                
Czech Republic  -12.434  -0.652             
Hungary  -12.013  0.265  0.808          
Bulgaria  -5.708  9.205  9.054  8.435       
Romania  -11.061  0.934  1.343  0.659  -7.104    
70 throughout 81 
   Russia  Poland  Czech Republic  Hungary  Bulgaria  Romania 
Russia                   
Poland  0.834                
Czech Republic  0.902  0.245             
Hungary  0.451  -0.477  -0.594          
Bulgaria  4.142  4.573  3.787  4.495       
Romania  0.932  0.348  0.121  0.648  -3.346    
82 throughout 89 
   Russia  Poland  Czech Republic  Hungary  Bulgaria  Romania 
Russia                   
Poland  -22.439                
Czech Republic  -23.052  -1.347             
Hungary  -21.272  0.861  2.053          
Bulgaria  -12.587  8.351  9.109  7.459       
Romania  -19.977  1.019  2.032  0.269  -6.745    
A second explanation effect is transfer pricing being evident in trade with candidate 
countries but not with Russia. EU direct investment are higher in EU candidate 
countries than in Russia (measured per capita), and they concentrate more on machinery 
and transport equipment than in Russia. It is more plausible to assume intra-firm trade 
with candidate countries than with Russia. Hence, transfer pricing might have played a 
significant role in this trade, but not in trade with Russia. 
The third proposal reads simply that  capital flight from Russia in chapters 70-81 could 





4.3 Further testing 
Last but not least, the method applied yields plausible results only when it detects 
chapters with capital flight indication. We extended our tests to two 4-digit industries 
where other sources report or assume the major part of Russian capital flight through 
exports (underpricing): crude oil (chapter 27090000)  and non-sophisticated crude oil 
products (chapter 2710). In both of them, the EU runs large deficits in trade with Russia 
(Table C). Crude oil imports of the EU are reported at the 6-digit level. Chapter 2710, 
however, consists of 48 different products. The benchmark country are imports of the 
EU from Norway in both cases. For constructing the multilateral price index we selected 
as further countries: Algeria, Lybia, Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia, and Syria. We applied the 
same procedure for calculating the price indices, but distinct to our former calculations 
we deleted all items where the number of observations was less than three (relevant for 
chapter 2710 only).8 
In both cases, prices of EU imports  from Russia are below prices in imports from 
Norway. Measured by the deviation from the mean value, Russian prices are the lowest, 
particularly in industry 2710. While EUROSTAT does not provide various natural 
qualities of crude oil imports (content of sulphur, for example), the modest price 
deviations in crude oil imports of the EU might yet explain quality differences. Results 
for chapter 2710 seem to be more explainable: price deviations are more pronounced. 
Capital flight through underpricing by Russian exporters might be an actual strategy, not 
easily to detect by tax authorities. 
Table 4: 
LnP* in chapters 2709 and 2710; imports of the EU 
   Russia  Lybia  Algeria  Saudi-Arabia  Nigeria  Syria  Mean 
2709  -0.059  -0.017  0.025  -0.079  0.019  -0.054  -0.027 
2710  -0.254  -0.149  -0.172  -0.156  -0.217  -0.219  -0.195 
   Deviation from mean value 
2709  -0.031  0.010  0.052  -0.051  0.047  -0.026  0.000 
2710  -0.060  0.045  0.023  0.038  -0.022  -0.025  0.000 
5.  Conclusions 
We applied a new method in analyzing trade-related capital flight. Pure price differences 
were calculated by the help of a multilateral Törnquist price index. We concentrated the 
analysis on 1.630 items in EU exports in CN chapters 7 and 8 to Russia. Bulgaria. the 
Czech Republic. Hungary. Poland and Romania and used EU intra-exports to France as 
                                                 




benchmark. Mean values were analysed by the double T-test. We found no evidence of 
capital flight by the overpricing of exports to Russia. We conclude. that capital flight 
from Russia via false invoicing of Russian imports is of minor importance. We found 
rather some evidence for transfer pricing in EU exports to the candidate countries 
considered here in comparison with Russia. We found further some evidence of 
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CN-Chapters analysed (2-digit overview) 
70 GLASS AND GLASSWARE 
71 NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS. PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES. 
PRECIOUS METALS. METALS CLAD WITH PRECIOUS METAL. AND ARTICLES 
THEREOF; IMITATION JEWELLERY; COIN 
72  IRON AND STEEL 
73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL 
74 COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
75 NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
76 ALUMINIUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
78 LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
79 ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
80 TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
81 OTHER BASE METALS; CERMETS; ARTICLES THEREOF 
82 TOOLS. IMPLEMENTS. CUTLERY. SPOONS AND FORKS. OF BASE METAL; PARTS 
THEREOF OF BASE METAL 
83  MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL 
84 NUCLEAR REACTORS. BOILERS. MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; 
PARTS THEREOF 
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF; SOUND 
RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS. TELEVISION IMAGE AND SOUND RECORDERS 
AND REPRODUCERS. AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF SUCH ARTICLES 
86 RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY LOCOMOTIVES. ROLLING-STOCK AND PARTS 
THEREOF; RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY TRACK FIXTURES AND FITTINGS AND PARTS 
THEREOF;  MECHANICAL. INCLUDING ELECTRO-MECHANICAL. TRAFFIC 
SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT OF ALL KINDS 
87 VEHICLES OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY ROLLING-STOCK. 
AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF 
88 AIRCRAFT. SPACECRAFT. AND PARTS THEREOF 





EU balance of trade with France and selected CEE countries in chapters 70-89. 1997 
- in 1.000 ECU - 
CN 
chapter  Russia  France  Poland  Czech Rep.  Hungary  Bulgaria 
70  103289  135340  61383  -166420  26466  -6925 
71  -993809  271227  -81815  12896  9088  -588 
72  -1086989  -272667  -73276  -155753  -23939  -267649 
73  506879  968602  -48243  -222713  94157  10635 
74  -1604352  81125  -502719  25385  29384  -106149 
75  -729387  72274  5526  12645  7139  -1992 
76  -1295131  443563  169437  21330  -212418  26861 
78  -10255  -1046  -6371  6909  3116  -25611 
79  -37161  -181733  -24374  4625  8098  -31420 
80  -29411  9146  791  926  1715  -573 
81  -199961  556  5544  -16429  4893  -125 
82  91782  327541  91764  37052  46327  598 
83  101929  393359  162880  56615  76864  9496 
84  4417288  6890448  4023304  1622368  -188732  145530 
85  2400235  2263321  1126282  1121238  179919  84628 
86  43618  -175610  43  -37876  -1340  6527 
87  1378552  -4493328  1797663  152235  921665  122741 
88  129739  1054286  -859  5844  19408  1412 
89  84457  136404  -56398  -9159  1293  -3412 
Source: Eurostat. 2002. 
Table C: 
EU balance of trade with Norway. Russia and selected countries in chapters 2709 and 
2710. 1997   
- in 1.000 ECU - 
Partner 
countries  Norway  Algeria  Libya  Nigeria  Saudi Arabia  Syria  Russia 
270900  -13825.9  -2405.6  -6136.9  -3830.1  -8651.1  -1607.1  -6965.8 
2710  -533.1  -1142.1  -914.9  40.2  -160.7  -47.7  -2803.9 
Source: Eurostat. 2002. 